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[Abstract] The paper is the author’s so-called ‘Opponent paper « to Susan Rose-
Ackerman’s proposals for good governance and anti-corruption poli-cies at the Copen-
hagen Consensus 2004 meeting 24–28 May. There the most promising anti-corruption
policies had to compete with other best poli-cies at other fields such as fight against AIDS,
malaria, hunger prevention, and so on. He argues that while corruption and governance
problems are important and may prevent any other kind of policy to succeed, no really
effective anti-corruption policy has so far been proposed, and if it was, we wouldn’t know
that it did. Hence, it would be unreasonable to make a strong claim for anti-corruption
projects against their competitors.
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The challenge raised by poor governance and corruption to be emphasised 
here is a challenge of tools: Do we have the ability to meet any global chal-
lenge if our basic tools for dealing with them, the formal organisations, are 
populated with a large number of leaders and ordinary members who shirk, 
embezzle or engage in corrupt transactions? The very same tools would have 
to be applied when solving the problems of governance and corruption. 
Hence, if corruption is a key problem, do we have any way of solving it? 
Rose-Ackerman (2004) underlines a different side of corruption: Skewed 
distribution of purchasing power based on private wealth induces illegal 
buying of influence. That undermines legitimate political power, particularly 
when based on voting power. This illegal buying of political and judicial 
decisions by private business, is nowadays called ‘state capture’, and recent 
research has been able to capture some of its possible quantitative dimen-
sions (e.g. Hellman et al. 2000). I think this return to old Marxian fields of 
inquiry has already become fruitful. There are also important spillover 
mechanisms from the political game to the day-to-day behaviour of formal 
organisations. Still, I consider the consequences of corruption for that behav-
iour to be the key challenge.  
 Rose-Ackerman addresses in her proposal five options, five roads of at-
tack: Voice and accountability, procurement reforms, tax reforms, changes 
in systems of business regulation and international efforts to limit high-level 
corruption in business. I will for reasons of space focus on the last option, 
but in order to so it is helpful to consider some of the empirical characteris-
tics of the field of governance and corruption as a research arena. 
Data: Do We Have Sufficiently Precise Knowledge of the 
Governance Challenge?  
Looked from outside, the challenge paper (Rose-Ackerman, 2004) may ap-
pear somewhat peculiar by making both the consequences and causes of cor-
ruption be classified according to their sources of statistical information. A 
rather heterogeneous picture of seemingly unrelated phenomena and meas-
ures is presented. This is not, however, a flaw in the paper as such, but re-
flects in an interesting way some inherent characteristics of the corruption 
and poor governance challenge itself and, to some degree, temporary limita-
tions of current state of relevant research. It has not yet quite digested the 
large number of recently available data in the field. 
In the following I will mainly discuss corruption, not because corruption 
and the other aspects of poor governance are synonymous phenomena, or 
always strongly causally linked, but because I have not found any option 
where trade-offs between the different dimensions of governance are both 
essential and possible to determine. With the more precise weighing of 
forces implied by such trade-offs, the problem of noisiness in the different 
governance indicators becomes acute.1  
                                                     
1. With regard to the problem at hand, one may, for example, believe that the long periods of 
relatively high degree of political stability in Kenya with relatively low-scale political 
violence are related to the high level of corruption. But are we in this case dealing with 
processes that are so predictable that we may for example, settle for an option that reduces 
corruption with 20% at the cost of increasing the probability of civil war with 10%? With 
such mixes of data noise and difficult-to-predict situations, I believe it is reasonable to re-
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With exceptions, such as Gunnar Myrdal (1968), few economists be-
lieved until recently that corruption was a researchable phenomenon. It was 
not researchable partly because no interesting model had been constructed, 
but more importantly, no quantitative data were available. Not least due to 
the early efforts of the author of the challenge paper ( Rose-Ackerman, 
1978), interesting models were soon constructed, but quantitative data were 
missing until the mid 1990s. The publication of such data, beginning with 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), was part of 
the political process that has made corruption and poor governance available 
as a public challenge where quantitative cost-benefit analyses of measures at 
least are thinkable.2  
Nevertheless, I will argue, corrupt transactions remain in many ways as 
unobservable as before. The quantitative information is not based upon di-
rect observation, with the exception of a few case studies that still are ex-
tremely scarce. The information is rather based on questionnaires that differ 
widely in how they relate to observable action. Since the different sources of 
quantitative information reflect the various forms of corruption and poor 
governance at different distances from the actual acts, it is reasonable to 
build different kinds of empirically based models around them. When closer 
to the actual corrupt acts, the wide variety of situations reflected now also in 
the data, cries out for specific empirically based models to analyse the set of 
normally small-scale options tailored to that particular challenge.  
Most quantitative research has been cross-country studies based on the 
most aggregate data. TI’s CPI index has been most frequently used, but an-
other developed in the World Bank, roughly using the same sources of in-
formation, but applying different principles of aggregation, is likely to be-
come as important.3 These indexes now allocate numbers for average 
corruptibility of almost every country in the world of some economic signifi-
cance, stimulating both political discussion and research.  
That research is of great potential value in assessing the economic dimen-
sions of the challenge of poor governance and corruption. The quantitative 
specification of the negative effects of corruption on growth has been para-
digmatic (Mauro (1995)), but many other effects have been studied, some of 
which have been dealt with in the challenge paper. Since the corruption level 
is not a policy instrument, however, models where corruption plays the role 
as dependent or intermediate variable are more immediately relevant. For 
example, in Ades and Di Tella (1999) the degree of economic openness im-
pacts corruption, and corruption influences growth. Since the degree of 
openness is possible to influence by a large number of policy instruments, 
                                                     
strict the range of options considered to situations where all the good things go together – 
less interesting for economists, but less demanding for the quality of the governance indi-
cators. That is, I may in the following treat corruption and poor governance as synony-
mous.  
2. Before then only commercially produced data were available. These data, however, still 
constitute the backbone of the indexes immediately available in the public domain, such 
as the TI and World Bank indexes. 
3. The aggregation principles of the World Bank index are explained in Kaufmann et al. 
(1999). They allow information from sub-series covering only a few countries when con-
structing the aggregate index covering most countries in the world. By being able to in-
clude data from more countries and through the fact that the World Bank researchers have 
built up other, easy to access, governance indicators of bureaucratic quality, voice and the 
rule of law, using the same aggregation methodology, it is safe to predict that it will be-
come the database for much research into corruption and poor governance in the future. 
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including tried methods of trade policy, the implications for the search of 
policy options are obvious.4 
The informational core of the TI’s and World Bank’s governance indexes 
is assessments made by experts and businessmen collected by different orga-
nisations. When constructing the indexes both the TI and the WB economists 
have, of course, noted many of the problems which arise through the aggre-
gation of heterogeneous data sources and devised two different econometric 
solutions. 
Both solutions assume, however, that the stochastic errors across sub-
indicators are independent. The assumption is crucial and difficult to relax, 
as noted by Kaufmann et al. (1999: 10). Without it, the gains in precision by 
aggregation become indefinite.5  
How reasonable is it that the strong correlation between the sub-indexes 
is due to correlation of errors, and not to independent observations of the 
same government characteristics? Several of the sub-indicators with the 
strongest inter-correlation are based on respondents’ answers to very general 
and vague questions about their perceptions of corruption levels in country 
A, B or C. The questions are not leading the respondents to focus on their 
own experience. At least in countries where the citizens have no daily, indi-
vidual experience of corruption, the assessments have to be based on the pro-
cess through which information about corruption reach the public domain. 
How is that process? 
As far as I know, little precise, empirically based knowledge is here 
available. As a first approximation, however, I will expect strong correlation 
and spillover effects: The experts read the same reports and gauge other ex-
perts’ statements. Since the assessments are often not based on individual 
experience, when expert X claims corruption in A is very high, expert Z has 
no clear evidence to the contrary, so when knowing X’s statement it may be 
optimal to make an assessment close to his. Informational cascades may 
easily develop in this context.6 The fact that the TI index in particular is 
widely published, reinforces the argument. The case of information given by 
expatriate businessmen is somewhat different, but they are not likely to base 
their assessments to only on their own, independent experience either. Most 
will be based upon other businessmen’s communication. The degree to 
which that will contain private information, will at best depend on how much 
genuine information other expatriates reveal.7 The striking way that corrup-
                                                     
4. As pointed out by Rose-Ackerman (2004), many explanatory variables in the corruption 
equations are past events, historical or geographical givens, impossible to influence today, 
and useless in option search. It is difficult to take authors seriously here when discussing 
the counterfactual of how much less corruption one might observe in parts of present-day 
Russia if it had been colonised by England (Treisman, 2002)! 
5. One reason why Kaufmann et al. (1999) are not emphasising this problem is that the 
relaxing of the assumption would result in a greater variance in the country estimates and 
that would only support their polemics against TI’s use of its index to publish a precise 
ranking of countries in terms of their (perceived) corruptness. An important ingredient in 
the WB aggregation procedure is that it (endogeneously) gives greater weights to those 
sub-indexes that are more strongly inter-correlated with the others. If that inter-correlation 
is due to inter-correlation of errors, however, this property of the aggregation procedure 
may not be of any advantage. 
6.  Many of the conditions for of such cascades to develop are fulfilled in this case (see, for 
example, Bikhchandani, et al., 1992).  
 7. The main reason why most information about corruption remains private (except the daily 
demand for bribes in high corruption areas) is, of course, that corrupt transactions usually 
are criminal and the agents performing them are interested in keeping them secret. Fur-
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tion has moved from being perceived as a sideline issue in the public mind to 
a major challenge today may in part reflect this informational structure 
(Andvig, 2002). 
The work under the auspices of the World Bank since 1996 to develop 
more detailed and focused information about corruption, such as the size and 
frequency of bribes paid by enterprises, and other sides of public admini-
stration may become one of the most interesting and important expansions of 
statistical information since the development of national accounting. The 
thrust of this research is reflected in Kaufmann’s (2003) strong headline: 
“The Power of Data: Governance Can be Measured, Monitored, and Rigor-
ously Analyzed.” It is now possible to construct reasonably comparable 
(across countries) measures of different forms of corruption, whether corrupt 
deals are honoured, and so on, for a large and increasing number of coun-
tries, all seen from the enterprises’ point of view. 
For some countries that information may be compared with the private 
households’ and public officials’ experience or perceptions in so-called diag-
nostic surveys.8 In another line of research guided by somewhat different 
theoretical presumptions, the World Bank has focused on the different bran-
ches of public government and asked different groups of officials about their 
perception and experience of governance issues including corruption.9 For a 
few Latin American countries Seligson (2002, 2003 ) has also collected a set 
of corruption data where households are asked about their direct experience. 
So far, however, most micro-based research has relied on the more 
widely collected business perception data, mentioned above, such as the 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES), but the results of these sur-
veys are interpreted as if they report the officials’ or enterprises’ own experi-
ence. In many cases this may be misleading. Sensibly, in order to gain 
answers from the enterprises about their experience of sensitive corruption, 
the questions had to be “phrased indirectly about the corruption faced by 
‘firms in your line of business’” (Hellman et al., 2000: 20). Despite the pre-
cautions taken, this is not the same as reporting experience. Given the infor-
mational nature of corrupt transactions, these perceptions are also likely to 
be strongly influenced by the other agents’ communication of their percepti-
ons, which may or may not be based on their own experience.  
An important example of possible ambiguity is the World Bank group’s 
paper on multinational companies’ behaviour in transition countries 
(Hellman et al., 2002). Here they find that enterprises from low-corruption 
countries roughly behave as corruptly as the locals even in the most corrupt 
countries. It is an interesting hypothesis, to which I return when dealing with 
the international efforts option, but a more straightforward interpretation is 
that the multinationals simply perceive the corruption problem roughly in the 
                                                     
thermore, the agents most likely to discover corrupt transactions, the public or private bu-
reaucracies directly involved, are also normally interested in keeping the acts secret to the 
public. In the case of private enterprises the economic losses when such information is re-
vealed, may prove significant, around 5% of stock values in more serious cases (Karpoff 
and Lott, 1995). At this level the information game may at best have a prisoner’s dilemma 
structure. It may be better for all enterprises if everyone told about his/her experience; if 
only you reveal it, you will lose.  
 8. See: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/diagnostics.html 
9. In the case of Bolivia, see Manning et al. (2000). So far, only a few countries are covered. 
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same way as the locals, they share the same “folklore of corruption” 
(Myrdal, 1968:940). 
Rose-Ackerman (2004) does not discuss the weak observational basis of 
most quantitative measures used in this field. The result is that one may be-
lieve this challenge to have more precise dimensions than is warranted. De-
spite all the progress and insights and hypotheses made through the quantita-
tive perception data, the challenge of corruption as a field of empirical re-
search is still its secret nature. In order to gain a more precise idea about the 
size of the corruption and poor governance challenges, more detailed analy-
sis of data sources is needed. In particular, we should know more about how 
the perceptions about them are formulated and, eventually, how these per-
ceptions may influence the performed actions. A few suggestive observa-
tions are made,10 but to my knowledge few concentrated research efforts. 
Cábelková’s (2001) study from Ukraine is an interesting exception. It mod-
els both the impact of actual experience, the impact of media and friends on 
perceptions and the impact of perceptions on the reported incidence of cor-
rupt transactions at a number of public institutions.  
Options – Do We Have the Tools to Deal with the Corruption 
Challenge? 
As pointed out by World Bank researchers (Huther and Shah, 2000) we have 
two rather different corruption challenges. In one case we have an honest 
principal, a government willing to deal with corruption and other forms of 
poor government, and where corruption is not a dominant form of behaviour 
among politicians and most branches of public administration. In this situa-
tion one may often simply create new, working tools that may repair the de-
fect ones: working anti-corruption agencies, reorganisation of public audit-
ing and hiring agencies, and so on. Corruption and poor governance certainly 
may prove important and difficult to handle issues also in this case, since 
corruption implies that people try to collect potential economic rents at-
tached to their positions in difficult-to-monitor situations. As crime it is dif-
ficult to detect. We may also have strong positive spillover effects in this 
case: If you make a corrupt transaction it becomes easier for me to do the 
same.  
It is the other challenge, however, the situation where the principal is dis-
honest or too weak to deal with a public apparatus permeated with corrup-
tion, that really is the serious one. Given the present level of cross-country 
information and concern, the resulting large pockets of mismanagement and 
deep poverty represent a major global challenge. The option of simply creat-
ing new bureaucratic tools is not likely to be available here. They are also 
likely to be affected. The tools available to deal with such situations are ei-
ther too weak or too harsh.  
                                                     
10. For example PricewaterhouseCooper (2001: 6) compares the distribution of different 
forms of experienced economic crime with their perceived prevalence among about 3 400 
European organisations, mostly business enterprises. While embezzlement constituted 
63% of the actual economic crime incidence, but 29% of the perceived prevalence, cor-
ruption constituted only 11% of the actual incidence, but 23% of the perceived preva-
lence. The sample space is defined by a list of possible types of economic crime. 
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 It is also the answer I read from the challenge paper. Since the harsh 
tools of outside military interventions or internal revolutions are both ex-
tremely risky and costly with too uncertain benefits, they will remain outside 
our scope of attention. To transform, let us say, the World Bank into a kind 
of activist, anti-establishment type of organisation is not an option either. We 
have to focus on the weaker instruments. Hence, Rose-Ackerman’s (2004) 
outlines of options deal with a combination of fairly weak measures that may 
have some positive effects on the second situation, and some measures that 
may mainly work as a response to the first situation. 
As noted in the introduction, in the deep corruption situation the national 
authorities are unlikely to have regular tools available since they are all 
likely to become corrupt. Note that this proposition assumes that the spill-
over mechanisms across different sectors of the public apparatus inside a 
country are much stronger than cross-country spillover within the same sec-
tor of administration, such as customs. While probably realistic in most 
cases, the assumption is left unexplained in most of the literature, the chal-
lenge paper included. Nevertheless, closer cross-country interaction at sector 
levels, such as the international anti-corruption movement in customs admi-
nistrations may assist in reducing corruption in the customs in high-corrup-
tion countries (or, eventually, stimulate corruption in low-corruption admini-
strations). In outlining international measures Rose-Ackerman has not suffi-
ciently underlined the possibilities through cross-country interaction at sec-
tor levels. More generally, interactions between a thoroughly corrupt public 
apparatus and some outside agencies or interests may have to be established 
in order to release internal pressures in corruption-decreasing directions. 
This is clearly the central part in the first ‘Oversight and Transparency’ 
option in Rose-Ackerman (2004). Here she reports several cases where the 
combination of publication of precise information of local programmes 
reaching locals with strong interests in the programmes has succeeded in 
mobilising groups of locals to become effective monitors of the programmes, 
sometimes drastically reducing the corrupt waste involved. Due to the pains-
taking research made at the World Bank (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004) it 
has been possible to determine the pre- and, post-experiment waste in 
school-transfer programme in Uganda. While 80% of funds, according to 
Rose-Ackerman (2004), were wasted before the experiment, only 20% were 
wasted afterwards. In addition to its scientific interests the example indicates 
the size of the waste involved in countries with high embezzlement and cor-
ruption propensities.  
If it is true that public expenditures in these countries are deliberately 
moved away from education to large infrastructure projects due to even lar-
ger corruption possibilities there, an obvious conclusion is that most foreign 
aid projects based on cost-benefit analysis need to be killed before leaving 
the drawing board. That is a conclusion I, like most others, am unwilling to 
draw, but here we have a major challenge. If we calculate the value of re-
sources spent on bribing to zero, as Rose-Ackerman does, the return on the 
original programme needs to be 50% in order to have a 10% return on the 
whole transfer programme.11  
                                                     
11. I find Rose-Ackerman’s proposal here for how to do cost-benefit analysis of anti-corrup-
tion projects very reasonable. The more valuable the original projects are, the more costly 
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Since unpaid local mobilisation may be difficult to sustain in the long 
run, and international support is short-run in nature, one may doubt if anti-
corruption programmes of this kind will be sustainable in the long run. In 
particular, in the Uganda case, the anti-corruption project may have been so 
successful in the first place because the rent-collectors here were among the 
less powerful. 
Presumably, most formal organisations located in the rich countries are 
comparatively low-corrupt and external to the system of formal organisati-
ons of the highly corrupt countries. May they either through designed or 
uncontrolled interaction become tools for improving the workings of the 
governance of high-corruption countries? Since I consider Rose-Ackerman’s 
paper here to be somewhat unsystematic both in its choice of issues and 
choice of options, I will focus on this issue.  
International Efforts 
 North- south interactions: Multinational companies 
 May the strong governance systems of the large multinational companies 
somehow induce lower corruption in high-corruption countries? The compa-
nies will be involved in three major type of activities: i) regular exports with 
modest involvement with public authorities, ii) delivery on public construc-
tion and consultancy projects (public procurement) which implies denser 
interaction, and the even tighter involvement implied by iii) foreign direct 
(real) investment.  
The international pressure towards opening the trade regime may here in-
duce less corruption than before, but in public procurement and FDI activi-
ties there are no obvious system-wide changes with clear impact on corrup-
tion tendencies. Data collected about the multinationals’ behaviour, give few 
grounds for optimism. For example, World Bank research into multinational 
bribing activities in the post-communist countries may indicate that their 
bribing connected to regular sales, in public procurement and FDI –related 
capture activities are roughly on the same scale as the locals’, although dif-
fering in details (Hellman et al., 2002).While not so clear-cut in this respect, 
the TI index of the corruption propensity in major exporting countries does 
not clearly contradict this result. 
One result of this research is that the corruption behaviour of US multi-
nationals is not among the best ones in the transition countries. It may sup-
port Rose-Ackerman neglecting of the OECD convention against bribing and 
the other treaties that intend to apply the stronger judicial systems in the 
home country to reduce their involvement in corrupt transactions in poor, 
highly corrupt countries. This conclusion appears to follow since the US has 
applied its judicial apparatus this way since the introduction of its Foreign 
                                                     
will the corruption waste be, and for given anti-corruption project expense, the higher the 
rate of return of that project. In general, a person who believes that no foreign aid project 
is likely to be of value, should not be so worried about corruption. The funds should not 
be transferred in any case. Another person believing both in the value of many of the ori-
ginal projects, may reach the same conclusion if corruption waste is very high, but for him 
or her the potential rate of return on corruption projects will be very high, if they work. If 
no efficient anti-corruption project is possible to formulate, we have a very difficult ethi-
cal situation, in many ways analogous to peace-keeping operations.  
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Corrupt Practices Act in 1977. The low probability of being caught supplies 
an explanation of why this may be the case. 
Nevertheless, this may be too rash a conclusion. The companies involved 
deny vehemently that they are engaged actively in corrupt activities abroad, 
but more importantly, the data may, as argued before, be interpreted as re-
flecting perceptions, not behaviour. Furthermore, in certain bribe situations 
created under experimental conditions, low probability, but high-value pun-
ishment is surprisingly effective in mitigating some forms of corruption 
(Abbink et al., 2002 )12 
It will be misleading to translate the effects of strong punishment in the 
experiment into real-world conditions by minor jail sentences or similar 
punishment directed against individuals. Long-lasting international bid deni-
als simulate better these experimental conditions, particularly so for large, 
multinational companies. To develop the OECD and the UN conventions in 
this direction,may make them a more potent option in fighting cross-country 
corruption. The fact is that the World Bank’s list of companies not allowed 
to bid by their violating no-corruption conditions of the Bank, so far (to my 
knowledge) does not contain any major, multinational company, and this 
surely undermines the credibility of the list.13  
I still believe more may be achieved along this road to make the multina-
tional companies to contribute less to corruption in high-corrupt countries 
than the voluntary “Publish What You Pay” and EITI initiatives recommen-
ded in Rose-Ackerman (2004). While increased information and transpar-
ency are certainly to be welcomed, I believe the NGO interests are too mud-
dled and transient to become any external force that may make the kind of 
pressure performed by the parents-teacher groups in Uganda. With regard to 
the interest groups internal to the harmed country, I expect also their pres-
sure to be weak in this case, since the potential increase in tax income result-
ing from the initiatives is likely to be widely spread.  
North-south interactions: Foreign aid 
Another important arena for transactions between high- and low-corrupt 
organisations is foreign aid. May such meetings result in the low-corrupt 
public and semi-public NGO organisations transfer their standards to the 
high-corrupt public apparatuses, or may the transfer of standards go in the 
opposite direction? After all, corrupt transactions are profitable for the indi-
viduals involved.  
Again we have few direct observations. To my knowledge there has been 
no systematic collection of evidence, although in a number of countries with 
a tradition of investigative journalism, such as Kenya, the number of docu-
                                                     
12. Rose- Ackerman (2004) does not use any of recent experimental evidence. Given the dif-
ficulty to transfer the results to real-world conditions, that may be reasonable, but since it 
is so difficult to observe corrupt transactions, the experiments may be more useful than in 
most other fields of economics, but sometimes even more difficult from an ethical point 
of view. At present experiments may shed light on such issues as whether stricter moni-
toring may increase corruption, the role of transparency in certain situations, the effective-
ness of appointed versus elected monitors, the preventive effects of rotation of officials, 
and so on. 
13. This list has already had important impact on the bidding outcomes of other public orga-
nisations. The impending case of Acres International now considered by the World 
Bank’s sanction committee may become an exception and improve the credibility of the 
list (The Guardian, March 16, 2004). 
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mented stories are large. So far we have to rely on more indirect evidence 
when regarding the larger picture. Alesina and Weder (1999) show that 
unlike private FDI, there is no indication that most foreign aid organisations 
till then had systematically tried to avoid highly corrupt countries, which 
may not be so surprising since these countries on average also are among the 
world’s poorest. Nevertheless, there is according to the World Bank and TI 
indexes, a wide variation in the corruption propensities and governance qual-
ity also inside this group of countries. 
One of the most hotly debated options is whether one may use the infor-
mation in the governance indexes to systematically direct foreign aid away 
from the most corrupt and into the poor countries with better governance. In 
addition to the direct effects such a scheme may give, it may yield disincen-
tives for behaving corruptly, giving politicians directing highly corrupt 
bureaucracies less resources for patronage. Following this line of approach, 
recent evidence has shown that even inside highly corrupt countries there are 
wide variations in the quality of the public sub-sectors (e.g. as documented 
for Bolivia in Manning et al, 2000). Might not this information also be used 
in even more fine-grained aid allocation? 
 Rose-Ackerman (2004: 40-41) touches upon this option at the end, but 
believing the countries with the worst governance would then tend be iso-
lated, probably sinking into deeper poverty, she does not discuss it system-
atically. Svensson (2001) suggests a more careful application of the idea: to 
give programme and fungible forms of aid to countries with good results on 
the governance indicators (and good macroeconomic policies), while limit-
ing aid to poor-governance countries to non-fungible projects or projects im-
plemented by well-working NGOs, but within the framework of a country 
plan drawn up by the aid donor(s). To some degree the allocation of foreign 
aid has recently been influenced by governance considerations, but to my 
knowledge no study of the effects of the policy shift on corruption has been 
made.  
Rose-Ackerman’s objections are reasonable, but since it is an option that 
goes to the core of the problem of corruption as a global challenge, I miss a 
more extensive discussion. The option deals, after all, directly with the trans-
mission mechanism from the ideas for solving a major global economic or 
social challenge, to their possible implementation. It is also evident that if, 
let us say 80% of aid funds may reach its destination under a system of good 
governance but only 20% with bad governance, very few projects will give 
any positive internal rate of returns in the last case, so to scrap projects up 
front may make good economic sense, if we knew that for sure.  
As pointed out in this context by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), the mar-
gin of errors of the government indexes is so large, however, that if only aid 
could be given to countries that are among the 50% least corrupt (and at least 
in the best half among half of the other indicators (which is the so-called 
Millennium Challenge Account conditions), only two of the 74 aid candi-
dacy countries would be certain not to qualify and only eight would certainly 
do so. 
If the errors in the sub-indexes are correlated, the confidence intervals 
would become even wider( Kaufmann and Kraay, 1999). I think we have 
good reasons to believe that the indicators are likely to be influenced by 
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country opinion fashions in the aid industry. It is striking that in 2002 coun-
tries like Rwanda, India and Mozambique were among the eight aid-worthy 
countries.14 For countries where there are observation from only one sub-in-
dex, the 90% confidence interval is so wide that in most cases the outcome – 
to be aid-worthy or not - would be determined almost by pure chance. The 
same would naturally apply to the 13 countries where data are completely 
missing. Hence, it is not possible to apply the policy in any rigorous manner. 
Moreover, if any index would be allowed to determine the aid given, all 
kinds of manipulation of the index, so well-known from the Soviet system, 
are likely to be tried, undermining the information value of the index itself. 
This said, the indexes of country corruption combined with bits and pieces of 
less perception-based indicators represent an improvement on purely anec-
dotal-based fashions which may otherwise rule the aid industry. Sometimes 
that fashion is so strong that it overrules the governance indicators. As poin-
ted out by Cooksey (1999) Uganda has been able to collect unreasonable 
share of foreign aid by projecting a good governance image although being 
at least as corrupt as its neighbours according to several corruption indica-
tors.  
Among the reasons why it appears to be few, if any positive spillover ef-
fects from the low-corrupt administrations to the high-corrupt ones some are 
deeply entrenched and difficult to do anything about. For example, a large 
number of informal feedbacks about the execution of a public project inter-
nal to a democratic country are likely to reach citizens and taxpayers. Some 
are collected by relevant pressure groups and put into effective use. No simi-
lar mechanisms exist with regard to foreign aid. While some multilateral 
organisations like the World Bank try to compensate by having more profes-
sional evaluation procedures than the bilateral aid organisations, their pro-
jects are even one step further away from the ultimate aid-giver. The poten-
tial monitors of foreign aid such as NGOs and researchers will not have the 
capacity of informal monitoring that home-country projects are exposed to. 
Moreover, they usually receive their main support from the same organisa-
tions they may monitor. Here is, of course, some possibility of reform by fin-
ancing monitoring differently. In particular cases, like the Uganda school 
case, it may even be possible to stimulate pressure groups in the receiving 
country. 
Some corruption-stimulating aspects of the cross-country aid interactions 
are in principle easy to reform. As noted by Svensson (2001), the pressure on 
aid administrations to disburse loans and grants before the end of the year 
and the incentives for disbursing funds both in the bilateral and multilateral 
aid organisations are strong disincentives against strict monitoring and sti-
mulate collusion with highly corrupt officials in poor countries.  
In research on corruption in high-corruption countries, low administrative 
wages are often emphasised. That sometimes is a problem, but a neglected 
problem in the cross-country aid interactions is rather that wages for tasks 
                                                     
14. As pointed out in Seligson (2003:6) the decline in Argentine’s status on the TI-index from 
5.2 in 1995, the second best in Latin America, to the bottom half by its 2.8 in 2002, is re-
markable. Such drastic change is difficult to explain, except through noting that Argentine 
in 1995 was considered very ‘successful’, while after the financial crisis of 2001-2002 it 
was considered a ‘failure’ among experts , probably also among the experts who rated its 
corruption rate. .  
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performed for foreign aid agencies often are way above regular government 
pay. Two widely different price levels for the same good or service are well-
known to be a clear-cut stimulant to corruption. Here collusion among donor 
agencies may bring down expert wage levels closer to government levels and 
thereby reduce the level of rent-seeking and corruption in the aid-agency-
country-official interactions. The present trends in international foreign aid 
policy away from projects to direct budget support may also reduce the 
harmful effects of high wage emulation on local officials. On the other hand 
the same policy would certainly reduce the external monitoring restrains on 
local corruption. 
So far, we have little information about the spillover from highly corrupt 
countries into aid agencies. Participating experts claim that the difference 
between the corruption propensities in the aid-giving and receiving countries 
persists in the aid interactions while corruption in multilateral organisations 
is somewhere in between (Cooksey, 1999). If not for other reasons, to make 
credible the anti-corruption work initiated recently by many different aid 
agencies, more systematic information should be collected and published.  
South-north interactions: The migration pressure  
Another major challenge brought up at the Copenhagen consensus, migra-
tion, in this case international migration, is also tied to the existence of two 
prices for the same service, labour performed in rich or poor countries. This 
situation is driving bribes in the opposite direction in the cross-country 
agency interactions. Bribes are paid by citizens in poor countries to interna-
tional agencies and formal organisations located in rich countries.  
In TI Kenya’s first corruption survey (2002) ‘Embassies and international 
organisations’ were ranked as no.10 among 52 public organisations taxing 
Kenyan households through bribes. Early 2002, UN Office of Internal Over-
sight Services released a report (UNOIOS A/56/733) which showed that part 
of the UNHCR staff had colluded with large gangs internal to refugee camps 
in Kenya taxing each successfully receiving refugee status for between US $ 
2000 and 5 000. Both local, international and foreign embassy organisations 
were involved.  
Focusing on what might be done about global challenges, including cor-
ruption, the tools of cross-country agency interactions, are clearly important 
for every issue. I have discussed and outlined a set of reforms based on 
Rose-Ackerman’s suggestions. Alas, so far research-based analysis has not 
discovered any sufficiently strong instrument to really meet the challenge of 
corruption and bad governance, I believe. 
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